Filming Day

By: Andrew McRoberts.

Today is filming day at Sands Anderson! 

I spent about an hour being filmed for various video clips that will be used on my firm website page, http://www.sandsanderson.com/attorneys/andrew_mcroberts.html, and on this blog page, www.VaLocalityLaw.com.  Other lawyers from various teams are also being filmed.

The film crew was supportive and helpful, although I did note the lack of a fully stocked green room, makeup assistant and personal trailer.  Maybe next time, I can remember to negotiate those in advance!

In this day and age of the visual taking precedence over the written word, it makes sense for Sands Anderson to take this step.  Some people would rather see me talk about this blog or what I do for about one minute, twenty seconds than read the identical content.  And, although I cannot promise, I certainly hope you will get a sense of my personality and passion from the video that would be more difficult to garner from the written word.

In social media and on the internet, video is king as well.  Studies have shown that tweets and posts that contain links to video content are preferred over those without.  YouTube, which features posted video clips, is one of the most frequented websites in the country.  The search engine Google prioritizes its search results to favor results with video as well.

So, Sands Anderson PC is headed into the video world with today’s filming.  Check back soon to these websites to see the results!

 

Misnomer: U.S. Supreme Court Holds Proper Defendant’s Knowledge is Key

By: Andrew McRoberts.

Sands Anderson is a blogging law firm.  If you go to our firm website home page, you will see the eleven blogs (at this time) supported by the lawyers of Sands Anderson PC.

Although this is a Virginia local government blog, often the firm’s blogs will discuss a topic of interest to Virginia local government lawyers that we will reprint here.  Such is the case with this post, first published on the Sands Anderson Risk Manager Blog by Erin McNeill, Esquire, with research assistance by Eric Howlett, summer associate and law student at Washington & Lee University.  While the Krupski case involves an interpretation of the rules for “relation back”  under the federal rules, it may well be relied upon by Virginia courts in interpreting the Virginia statute, which contains identical language.

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Supreme Court Holds That ‘Close Enough” Counts When Naming Parties to Suit

On June 7, 2010, in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., No. 09-337, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 7, 2010), the Supreme Court of the United States held that “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs the circumstances under which an amendment is considered to take effect on the original date of filing, and not on the date the amendment is actually made. Specifically, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) governs amendments that change the party being sued or the naming of the party being sued. State rules and statutes concerning amendments to correct misnomer or misjoinder often contain language similar to Rule 15(c). Virginia Code section 8.01-6, for example, contains language identical to the Federal Rule. The Krupski decision, therefore, may have far-reaching implications for state civil procedure as well.

In Krupski, the petitioner, Wanda Krupski, suffered a nautical misadventure—she tripped over a cable while aboard a cruise ship and fractured her femur. Krupski mistakenly filed suit against Costa Cruise Lines, the sales and marketing agent for the ship’s owner and proper defendant, Costa Crociere. By the time Krupski amended her Complaint, the limitations period for her claim had run. Krupski sought to invoke Rule 15(c); counsel for Costa Crociere argued that the amended Complaint was not brought within the limitations period and could not relate back under Rule 15(c).

The District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed. Rule 15(c) requires, in part, that the plaintiff show that the newly-named defendant “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The courts adopted a narrow interpretation of “mistake” under this Rule. They reasoned that Krupski knew or should have known to file suit against Costa Crociere because her ticket identified Costa Crociere as the ship’s owner. Therefore, they treated her misdirected lawsuit as an affirmative decision to sue the wrong entity—not as a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. The courts further reasoned that Krupski waited too long to amend her complaint after she knew of Costa Crociere’s existence.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the lower courts had misapplied Rule 15(c) and that Costa Crociere “should have known that Krupski’s failure to name it as a defendant in her original complaint was due to a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Krupski, slip op. at 18. The Court explained that Rule 15(c) does not focus on the rationality of the plaintiff’s mistake—just that the plaintiff made a mistake concerning the proper party. Whether Krupski knew or should have known that Costa Crociere existed is irrelevant for the purposes of this determination. Instead, the Rule is concerned with whether the prospective defendant knew or should have known that it was an intended party to the lawsuit. The Court determined that Costa Crociere should have been on notice for several reasons:

(a) Costa Cruise Lines and Costa Crociere are related corporate entities with similar corporate names (“crociere” is Italian for “cruises”);
(b) Krupski’s Complaint described Costa Crociere’s activities, but it named Costa Cruise Lines; and
(c) Advertisements on the ticket mentioned the carrier as “Costa Cruises” without clarifying whether this referred to Costa Cruise Lines or Costa Crociere.

Furthermore, the Court observed that Costa Cruise Lines made no attempt to correct Krupski’s mistake until after the limitations period had expired. The Court seemed particularly concerned that Costa Crociere would profit from an obvious mistake that its subsidiary only helped to perpetuate.

The Court also clarified that the speed with which a plaintiff moves to amend her Complaint has no bearing on whether the amendment relates back. Although Rule 15(c) contains a number of requirements, haste is not one of them.
The Krupski opinion will substantially affect how many federal courts approach Rule 15(c). Krupski indicates the Supreme Court’s willingness to impute notice to a related, similarly-named corporation. A corporation, therefore, will not be in the clear when a plaintiff has mistakenly filed suit against one of the corporation’s subsidiaries—even after the limitations period has expired.

Not only does this opinion expand the protections under Rule 15(c), but it may have implications under state law. In Virginia, for example, the standard for amendments that correct a misnomer includes language identical to Federal Rule 15(c). See VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-6(iv) (“An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted . . . relates back to the date of the original pleading if . . . that party knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against that party.”) When state courts confront the same question under often-identical state rules and statutes, the Supreme Court’s reasoning will be highly applicable and should be highly persuasive. Thus, Krupski will have extensive implications for federal and state civil procedure.

 

Virginia BZAs Get “Off the Hook” on Appeal

By: Andrew McRoberts.

The 2010 Virginia General Assembly adopted HB 1063, which is a helpful simplification of the process by which BZA decisions are appealed to circuit court. It is effective July 1, 2010.

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Issues with Cash Proffer ‘Delayed Payment’ Law

By: Andrew McRoberts.

A number of local government attorneys have been asking tough questions about HB 374 and SB  632, identical bills which became effective law on July 1.  2010 Va Acts of Assembly ch. 5492010 Va Acts of Assembly ch. 613. (more…)

 

Second Amendment Applies to States (and Localities)

By: Andrew McRoberts.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules for Incorporation in McDonald v. City of Chicago: Litigation Likely

Last year, this blog reported that the U.S. Supreme Court would be ruling on a key Second Amendment case arising in Chicago that may have a bigger impact on state and local governments than the D.C. gun ban case previously decided.  The post was entitled, “U.S. Supreme Court to hear Key Second Amendment Case.” (more…)

 

Zoning and Privatization of Virginia’s ABC Stores

By: Andrew McRoberts.

In his campaign, Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell proposed privatization of the state-owned ABC (liquor) stores as one way to raise revenue without raising taxes.  It is important to remember that taking a use that is now public and making it private has repercusions under local land use law and can have concerns for the citizens.

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New Opinions from the Virginia Supreme Court

By: Andrew McRoberts.

The Virginia Supreme Court issued four opinions today of particular interest to local governments.  Three involve localities as parties (City of Falls Church, County of Fairfax, and Town of Vienna), and the fourth involve a construction case filed against the Commonwealth of Virginia in which the Court addresses several issues of interest to local governments.  (Excerpted from the Supreme Court of Virginia website:

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Evolution in eDiscovery Case Law

By: Andrew McRoberts.

Local governments, like all litigants, are facing a brave new world of electronic documents and discovery.  When the 21st century ease of creating, sharing and destoying information meets the long-standing law of spoliation, there is a volatile mix. 

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Webinar: Vested Rights in Zoning 2010

By: Andrew McRoberts.

On May 19, a team of great folks at Sands Anderson and our special guest Karen Harwood conducted a webinar on the State of Vested Rights (in Zoning), 2010 — the first installment of an ongoing series called the Sands Anderson Land Use Forum

We’ve been busy!  (This will explain, in part, the length of time since my last post, for which I apologize.)

Planned for several months, the webinar was well-received and timely, given two major vested rights decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court in 2009, Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Blacksburg, 277 Va. 250, 673 S.E.2d 170 (2009) and Board of Supervisors of Stafford County v. Crucible, 278 Va. 152, 677 S.E.2d 283 (2009), and the amendment  of the vested rights statute, Virginia Code § 15.2-2307, by the 2010 General Assembly via HB 1250.

The webinar included an overview of vested rights law that lead up to the codification of a Virginia statutory vested rights standard in 1998, the vested rights cases since codification, most notably City of Suffolk, ex rel Herbert v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 580 S.E.2d 796 (2003), and, of course, Hale and Crucible.

The webinar also included excellent analysis by Karen Harwood, former Deputy Fairfax County Attorney and long-time legislative liaison for Fairfax County.  Karen gave her perspective as one involved in both the General Assembly process that lead to the original codification of vested rights in Virginia in 1998, and this year’s process that led to this year’s HB 1250.  Her extensive experience in both land use law and in the legislature, and her straight-forward commentary and advice made the webinar a learning experience for everyone.

Joining me on the panel from Sands Anderson were Ann Neal Cosby and Annemarie Cleary, fellow members of the Sands Anderson local government team and primary authors of the local government amicus curiae brief in the Crucible case.  Since I authored the local government amicus curiae brief in the Hale case, Sands Anderson has been very active in the advancement of vested rights law in Virginia!

There were two primary goals in offering the webinar for free to local government attorneys, zoning officials and staff: (i) to give local governments free training at a time when their budgets are stretched, and (ii) to give timely commentary and assistance to local governments trying to address HB 1250.

As discussed in an earlier post on this blog, HB 1250 added a new defined “significant affirmative governmental act” (SAGA) to the six already delineated in the statute.  Now, for the first time, a written determination by the zoning administrator can, under the right circumstances, be a SAGA.  By statute, a SAGA can potentially vest rights to a use or density despite a change in the zoning ordinance.  So the stakes can be quite high.

Here is an excerpted version of the outline on Vested Rights 2010, to give you an idea of the content of the webinar.  Local government attorneys, zoning officials and staff members are welcome to contact me for the full outline.

Thanks to the over 200 local government attorneys, zoning officials and staff who participated, and the entire team that made the webinar a success! 

We are planning another installment of the Sands Anderson Land Use Forum for Fall 2010, tentatively scheduled for November 17, 2010.  What topic would you like to see presented?

 

Can You Sue a Board of Equalization in Virginia?

By: Andrew McRoberts.

J&D Partnership v. Board of Equalization
Loudoun County Circuit Court, Civil Action No. 58503

In 2008, as the real estate market stagnated, the Loudoun County Board of Equalization (BOE) received a huge spike in assessment appeals, far more than in the past. This was especially true with appeals of assessments for commercial properties, which are typically much more complex than residential ones. On many occasions, some thinly-supported appeals had been withdrawn after a large amount of staff and BOE time had been spent in analysis.

Fearing even more appeals in 2009, the BOE adopted new rules and procedures for applicants for commercial properties which among other things, required the applicants to disclose what they thought fair market value to be, address the three recognized appraisal methods and provide any comparable sales relied upon.

A number of commercial landowners reportedly failed to comply with these requirements by the deadline for applications to be filed in June. In September, these landowners each received a letter from the BOE, which told them that their BOE appeal would proceed no further, and their next step would be to file a lawsuit in the circuit court. Some of these landowners and their counsel objected to the BOE’s action, for many reasons. Most significantly, they objected to the authority of the BOE to adopt such rules and refuse them a hearing if not followed.

After unsuccessfully objecting directly to the BOE, nine of these commercial property owners, represented by John H. Foote, Esquire of Walsh Colucci Lubeley Emrich & Walsh and Ilene Baxt Boorman, Esquire of Wilkes Artis, filed a declaratory judgment action in Loudoun County Circuit Court. There were four counts in the complaint, alleging the action of the BOE in adopting these rules and denying a hearing to the plaintiffs was ultra vires (given the Dillon Rule), arbitrary and capricious, and violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process and equal protection rights.

The prayer for relief requested a declaration that (i) the BOE acted beyond its authority in dismissing the cases without a hearing and therefore deprived the plaintiffs of their due process and equal protection rights, (ii) the BOE must provide the plaintiffs a hearing, and (iii) the BOE cannot establish the form of evidence the taxpayers must present.

Sands Anderson and myself were hired to defend the case. In response to the complaint, I filed three demurrers on behalf of the BOE.

The first demurrer turned the plaintiffs’ Dillon Rule argument around on them and asserted that the BOE is not sui juris and therefore cannot sue and be sued. This demurrer cited the BZA of Fairfax County v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 276 Va. 550, 666 S.E.2d 315 (2008) arguing that just as the BZA in that case had no authority to sue the Board of Supervisors “or anyone else,” a BOE was just as limited in its ability to be sued by anyone. It also asserted that there simply is no statutorily-prescribed mode of proceeding to sue the BZA, a quasi-judicial arm of the state.

The second demurrer asserted that a declaratory judgment would be inappropriate because an adequate remedy at law existed, i.e. an appeal of the BOE’s action to the circuit court as suggested in the Chairman’s letter. The Declaratory Judgment Act supplements normal legal processes and where such processes are adequate, they should be followed.

The third demurrer asserted that a declaratory judgment would be inappropriate because it sought to correct past behavior as opposed to guide future conduct. The Declaratory Judgment Act is not appropriate to litigate over past events, but is intended to prevent litigation by allowing clarification of rights and procedures before damage is done. In this case, the BOE had taken final action for tax year 2009.

On January 13, 2010, visiting Judge Herman A. Whisenant, Jr. heard oral argument and agreed with all three demurrers. In addition, Judge Whisenant ruled sua sponte that by receiving the applications for relief from the plaintiffs and issuing the letter in response, the BOE had provided the plaintiffs any hearing required by the statute and issued the equivalent of an order. The Court dismissed the case with prejudice. The final order was entered on March 1, 2010, and was not appealed.

I would be pleased to share the final order (with a transcript of the court’s ruling attached), and discuss the case with any interested local government attorney. Please contact me directly.

What do you think about this result?  Should a Board of Equalization or a Board of Zoning Appeals be treated like a court?  Courts, after all, do not get sued, but their decisions get appealed.  Or, should a BOE or BZA be treated like other local government bodies that can sue and be sued?